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WATCH OR REPORT? LIVESTREAM OR HELP?
GOOD SAMARITAN LAWS REVISITED: THE NEED
TO CREATE A DUTY TO REPORT
PATRICIA GRANDE MONTANA
ABSTRACT
In July 2017, a group of five Florida teenagers taunted a drowning disabled man
while filming his death on a cell phone. In the video, the teenagers laughed and
shouted harsh statements like “ain’t nobody finna to help you, you dumb bitch.” At
the moment the man’s head sank under the water for the very last time, one of the
teenagers remarked: “Oh, he just died” before laughter ensued. None of the teenagers
helped the man, nor did any of them report the drowning or his death to the authorities.
Because the Good Samaritan law in Florida, like in most states, does not require
bystanders to assist another person who they know is in danger or is suffering serious
physical harm, the teenagers who chose to film, rather than aid, the drowning disabled
man are free of any liability. They face no penalties for their inaction and no
punishment for their callousness.
This Article urges states to revisit traditional Good Samaritan laws. States need to
consider penalizing a person’s failure to aid when another person is clearly in danger
of physical harm or death. This need is particularly great given the power of social
media and its intersection with a bystander’s ability and decision to help. As
technology advances, relationships have become increasingly impersonal, thereby
diminishing the individual’s connection to and compassion for others. Social media
has added a new dimension to the longstanding debate of whether laws should impose
on bystanders a duty to help. In cases where a bystander is observing a crime online,
the individual can meet the duty quite simply by alerting authorities to the crime or
danger. And in cases where the circumstances might tempt a bystander to use social
media rather than provide help, the legal duty will compel the more moral choice.
Accordingly, states should adopt duty to aid statutes mandating that bystanders give
aid or call for help when they can.
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“Yea we just saw [a man] die, we could’ve helped his ass.
We didn’t even try to help him.”1
In March 2017, a fifteen-year-old girl in Chicago was sexually assaulted by six
men as they livestreamed the assault on Facebook.2 At least forty people watched the
vicious attack yet did nothing to help.3 Not one of the dozens of spectators called the
police.4 Only after the victim’s mother reported the assault and showed authorities
screen grabs of the attack did the police even learn that the attack was livestreamed
for the public to view and potentially stop. 5
Later, in July 2017, a group of five Florida teenagers taunted a drowning disabled
man while filming his death on a cell phone. 6 From the shore, the teenagers mocked,
cursed, and laughed at the disabled man while he was drowning in a retention pond,
struggling for his life and screaming for help. 7 Viewers of the video can hear the
teenagers laughing and shouting harsh statements like “ain’t nobody finna to help you,
you dumb bitch.”8 At the moment the man’s head went under the water for the last
time, one of the teenagers remarked: “Oh, he just died” before laughter ensued.9 None
of the teenagers helped the man,10 nor did any of them report the drowning or his death
to the authorities.11 Instead, they laughed about the man’s drowning death and later
1

For the Florida teenager’s cell phone video recording of the drowning disabled man in
Cocoa, Florida, see Disabled Man Pleading for Help Drowns as Teens Laugh and Mock,
YOUTUBE (July 20, 2017) [hereinafter Disabled Man Pleading for Help],
https://youtu.be/e3zD_Y2sGqY.
2

Michael Tarm, Facebook Live Attack Stirs Questions About Witnessing Crimes Online,
CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 23, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-facebooklive-attack-stirs-questions-about-witnessing-crimes-online-20170323-story.html.
3 David Schaper, Should Viewers of Facebook Live Gang Rape Face Charges?, NPR (Apr.
4, 2017), http://www.npr.org/2017/04/04/522574666/should-viewers-of-facebook-live-gangrape-face-charges; Tarm, supra note 2.
4

Schaper, supra note 3.

5

Rosa Flores & Susannah Cullinane, 2 Teens Arrested in Chicago Sex Assault Streamed
Online, CNN (Apr. 3, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/02/us/chicago-facebook-gang-rapearrest/index.html.
6 Niraj Chokshi, Teenagers Recorded a Drowning Man and Laughed, N.Y. TIMES (July
21,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/21/us/video-drowning-teens-florida.html;
Disabled Man Pleading for Help, supra note 1.
7

Chokshi, supra note 6.

8

Disabled Man Pleading for Help, supra note 1.

9

Chokshi, supra note 6.

10

Id.

11

Id.
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posted the video with their perverse commentary on social media. 12 Ultimately, a
family member of the victim spotted the video online and shared it with authorities. 13
Cases like these illustrate a disturbing trend: an increase in both the livestreaming
of crimes14 and the filming of accidents or disastrous events for posting online to boost
traffic to personal social media sites.15 This trend is even more disturbing when
situations have bystanders present who could have helped prevent or stop the crime or
tragedy but did not, clearly valuing a relationship with social media more than a moral
responsibility to help others.16
Because the Good Samaritan laws in both Illinois and Florida, like in most states,
do not require bystanders to assist another person who they know is in danger or
suffering serious physical harm, 17 the online spectators who did not stop the sexual
assault of the fifteen-year-old girl in Chicago or the teenagers who filmed the
drowning disabled man in Florida are free from any liability. They face no penalties
for their inaction and no punishment for their callousness. In both cases, the bystanders
could have easily helped. In fact, a simple call to authorities might have resulted in
very different outcomes for both victims.18 Yet, with few exceptions, Good Samaritan
12

Id.; see Disabled Man Pleading for Help, supra note 1.

13

Chokshi, supra note 6.

14 Alene Tchekmedyian & Alexandra Zavis, The Cleveland Killer Wasn’t the First to Post
a Gruesome Crime. Welcome to the Dark Side of Sharing, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2017),
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-livestream-crime-20170418-story.html.
15 Jillian Peterson & James Densley, Why the Trend of Posting Gruesome Acts Online?,
STAR TRIB. (Apr. 19, 2017), http://www.startribune.com/why-the-trend-of-posting-gruesomeacts-online/419900553/; Amelia J. Uelmen, Crime Spectators and the Tort of Objectification,
12 U. MASS. L. REV. 68, 77, 80 (2017) (explaining how there are “frequent accounts of
bystanders gathering to snap cell phone pictures of assaults, rapes, and even murders, as well as
more run-of-the-mill accidents” partly to “satisfy[] [a] captive online audience.” (footnote
omitted)). This “phenomenon reflects a culture that has become so desensitized to violence that
observers barely flinch when taking out their cameras and hitting record . . . .” Id. at 80; but see
David A. Hyman, Rescue Without Law: An Empirical Perspective on the Duty to Rescue, 84
TEX. L. REV. 653, 656 (2006) (finding that proven cases of non-rescues are “extraordinarily
rare,” and thus there is no need to change the laws to require a duty to rescue).
16 “[A] bystander’s decision to engage the scene indicates that he or she has already
‘prioritized’ his or her time and attention [over the victim’s needs].” Uelmen, supra note 15, at
115–16; see id. at 92, 108 (arguing that a legal obligation should not apply to “pure
bystanders”—those who pass by and otherwise disengage from the scene of the crime or
accident—but should attach to “engaged spectators”—bystanders who directly engage the scene
and the victim by either objectifying or exploiting the victim).
17 FLA. STAT. § 768.13 (2017); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 49/1 et seq. (2018); see also Jen
Fifield, Why It’s Hard to Punish ‘Bad Samaritans’, PEW CHARITABLE TR. (Sept. 19, 2017),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2017/09/19/why-its-hardto-punish-bad-samaritans.
18 In both cases, the bystanders made a “deliberate decision to treat the incident as a show
rather than a traumatic human emergency which would have required direct assistance or a call
for help.” Uelmen, supra note 15, at 109; see also Steven J. Heyman, Foundations of the Duty
to Rescue, 47 VAND. L. REV. 673, 755 (1994) (arguing that “rescuer and victim are not mere
strangers, but members of a broader community” and thus “the community has a responsibility
to protect its citizens from both criminal violence and other forms of harm”).
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laws do not mandate that bystanders help in any way, 19 nor do those laws require that
bystanders alert authorities when they know someone needs help.20
This Article urges states to revisit these traditional Good Samaritan laws. States
should consider penalizing a person’s failure to aid when another person is clearly in
danger of physical harm or death. This need is particularly great given the power of
social media and its intersection with a bystander’s ability and decision to help. As
technology advances, relationships have become increasingly impersonal, thereby
wearing at an individual’s connection to and compassion for others. Social media has
added a new dimension to the longstanding debate of whether laws should impose a
duty to help on bystanders.21 In cases where a bystander is observing a crime online,
a bystander can meet this duty to help quite simply by alerting authorities to the crime
or danger. And in cases where a bystander might be tempted to use social media rather
than help, the legal duty will compel the latter, more moral choice.
Thus, this Article argues that lawmakers need to change the Good Samaritan laws
to add, at a minimum, a duty to report requirement, whereby bystanders would be
required to contact law enforcement or emergency personnel when they see or
otherwise know that another person is in danger or the victim of a crime. The Good
Samaritan laws should punish bystanders who sit idly by as another person is suffering
and ideally punish even more harshly those individuals who choose to record that
suffering for personal enjoyment or gain. 22
To that end, this Article first examines current Good Samaritan laws and discusses
the few that presently have a duty to report requirement or like equivalent. Next, this
Article explores the reasons why states have historically rejected laws imposing on
others a duty to render aid. The resistance to imposing such a duty generally stems
from concerns over interfering with individual autonomy and legislating morality as
19

DECHERT LLP, SAVELIFE FOUND., THOMSON REUTERS FOUND., GOOD SAMARITAN LAWS
3
(2014),
https://www.trust.org/contentAsset/raw-data/7be34cce-ea0d-4c90-8b3953427acf4c43/file (“The majority of U.S. jurisdictions . . . do not impose an affirmative
obligation as part of the Good Samaritan statutes.”).
20

Fifield, supra note 17.

21

See Uelmen, supra note 15, at 75.

Concerns about a particular form of “mocking and maligning” have crystallized with
the pervasive presence of recording devices such as cell phones. . . . [T]hose who take
cell phone pictures are hardly ignoring the victim or doing nothing. Rather, they are
engaging the attack by focusing on it, and filming or photographing it. Such conduct
objectifies and exploits another human being precisely at a moment in which this person
is vulnerable. In many situations, this objectification and exploitation is exacerbated by
subsequently posting the photograph or video recording on social media.
Id.
22 Discussions have concerned whether it should be a crime to livestream a crime or share
videos of a crime online. For example, New York State Senator Phil Boyle has proposed
legislation that would make the broadcast or distribution of footage of criminal activity by the
perpetrator a fourth-degree crime, carrying potential penalties of up to forty-eight months in
prison, a fine, or a combination of both. NY Senator: Outlaw Streaming Violence on Social
Media, U.S. NEWS (Apr. 28, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/newyork/articles/2017-04-28/ny-senator-outlaw-streaming-violence-on-social-media. Notably, the
legislation applies to the perpetrators only, not bystanders; bystanders who film a crime while
it is occurring would be exempt. Id.
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well as the practical constraints on enforcing such a law efficiently and fairly. 23
Finally, this Article explains why those reasons no longer apply now that technology
has made reporting seamless. Even so, stronger public policy considerations outweigh
those reasons, including, among other public policy considerations, stopping crimes
and preventing physical harm where possible, deterring immoral and harmful
behavior, and increasing personal and civic responsibility to help others in need.
Accordingly, states that have not done so already or have done so only narrowly
should quickly move to adopt broad duty to report statutes and counter the trend of
bystander inaction and callousness.
I. GOOD SAMARITAN LAWS: A REVIEW
A. Most Good Samaritan Laws Provide Civil Immunity but Require No Duty to Help
All states, including the District of Columbia, currently have some form of a Good
Samaritan statute.24 Good Samaritan statutes typically provide civil immunity to
individuals who render aid at the scene of an emergency to another person whom they
believe is injured or in serious threat of injury. 25 This immunity usually extends to
health care professionals or other licensed or trained individuals when they are
assisting without compensation.26 Regardless of who is giving the aid, the immunity
almost never covers individuals who render aid in a grossly negligent or reckless
manner,27 nor do these statutes provide the same protection from a civil suit to
compensated health care professionals or other licensed or trained individuals. 28
Though other provisions may cover such professionals, their duties are different and
usually higher than individuals who volunteer their help and have no expertise or
training in emergency medical situations.29 Some statutes are more specific in their
23 See generally Joshua Dressler, Some Brief Thoughts (Mostly Negative) About “Bad
Samaritan” Laws, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 971 (2000) (refuting justifications for Bad
Samaritan laws).
24

D.C. CODE § 7–401 (2017); Hyman, supra note 15, at 679.

25

See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 17–95–101 (2017); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 6801 (2017);
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5–603 (West 2017); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32–03.1–02
(2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.23 (West 2017).
26

E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 17–95–101(a) (2017) (“Any health care professional . . . who in
good faith lends emergency care or assistance without compensation at the place of an
emergency or accident shall not be liable for any civil damages . . . .” (emphasis added)).
27 E.g., id. § 17–95–101(b)(2) (“[U]nless the act or omission was not in good faith and was
the result of gross negligence or willful misconduct.”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 6801(a) (2017)
(“[U]nless it is established that such injuries or such death were caused willfully, wantonly or
recklessly or by gross negligence on the part of such person.”); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD.
PROC. § 5–603(a)(1) (West 2017) (extending civil immunity only if “[t]he act or omission is not
one of gross negligence . . . .”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32–03.1–02 (2017) (“[U]nless it is plainly
alleged in the complaint and later proven that such person’s acts or omissions constituted
intentional misconduct or gross negligence.”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.23 (West 2017)
(“[U]nless such acts constitute willful or wanton misconduct.”).
28 E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.23 (West 2017) (“Nothing in this section applies to
the administering of such care or treatment where the same is rendered for remuneration, or
with the expectation of remuneration . . . .” (emphasis added)).
29

E.g., id.
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protections.30 For example, a number of states now have particularized protection for
individuals who use an automated external defibrillator while rendering care,31 but
overall, the Good Samaritan statutes of most states have very few substantive
differences.
Arkansas’s Good Samaritan statute is a nice illustration of a typical, wellorganized statute that broadly extends liability to bystanders, both those with and
without training, and precludes liability only under the narrowest of circumstances. 32
The first part of the statute addresses when health care professionals who give aid
voluntarily—not for pay—will be protected. That portion of the statute reads as
follows:
(a) Any health care professional under the laws of the State of Arkansas
who in good faith lends emergency care or assistance without
compensation at the place of an emergency or accident shall not be liable
for any civil damages for acts or omissions performed in good faith so long
as any act or omission resulting from the rendering of emergency assistance
or services was not grossly negligent or willful misconduct. 33
The second part of the statute addresses the circumstances under which an average
person will be protected. It reads as follows:
(b) Any person who is not a health care professional who is present at an
emergency or accident scene and who:
(1) Believes that the life, health, and safety of an injured person or a person
who is under imminent threat of danger could be aided by reasonable and
accessible emergency procedures under the circumstances existing at the
scene thereof; and
(2) Proceeds to lend emergency assistance or service in a manner calculated
in good faith to lessen or remove the immediate threat to the life, health, or
safety of such a person, shall not be held liable in civil damages in any
action in this state for any act or omission resulting from the rendering of

30 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 17–95–101(c) (2017) (extending immunity to volunteer
heath care professionals who render “emergency assistance to a participant in a school athletic
event or contest . . . .” (emphasis added)); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8331.3(a) (2017) (providing
protection specifically from civil liability to those persons who attempt to help a “victim of a
personal injury crime . . . .”).
31 See, e.g., IND. CODE § 34–30–12–1(c) (2017) (“A person who gratuitously renders
emergency care involving the use of an automatic external defibrillator is immune from liability
for any act or omission not amounting to gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct . . .
.” (emphasis added)); IOWA CODE § 613.17(2) (2017) (“[A person] who render[s] emergency
care or assistance relating to the preparation for and response to a sudden cardiac arrest
emergency, shall not be liable for any civil damages for acts or omissions arising out of the use
of an automated external defibrillator . . . .” (emphasis added)).
32

ARK. CODE ANN. § 17–95–101 (2017).

33

Id. § 17–95–101(a).
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emergency assistance or services unless the act or omission was not in good
faith and was the result of gross negligence or willful misconduct. 34
Historically, the purpose of Good Samaritan statutes was to encourage bystanders
to help those in danger when they can.35 Subjecting bystanders to civil liability would
be unfair, as would penalizing them for making mistakes when acting in good faith
and giving help to another in obvious need of care. Therefore, as exemplified in the
Arkansas statute above, states chose to protect good Samaritans by extending
immunity to them even if they were negligent in their care.36 The rationale was that
with this known immunity, bystanders would be more inclined to help, consequently
preventing more injuries and saving more lives. 37 At the same time, states wanted to
ensure that bystanders were careful in the way they rendered aid.38 To this end, as also
exemplified in the Arkansas statute above, most states carved out exceptions for
grossly negligent, reckless, or willful misconduct so that bystanders could not make
emergency situations worse for an already injured individual without incurring
liability.39
Importantly, most Good Samaritan statutes focus solely on protecting those who
choose to act and render aid to someone in need.40 The statutes do not require that
bystanders act and render aid, even if providing aid is possible and would involve little

34

Id. § 17–95–101(b)–(b)(2). The statute has two other sections: one definitional and the
other more substantive. The definitional section lists licensed and trained individuals who
qualify as “health care professionals” within the meaning of the statute. Id. § 17–95–101(d).
The additional substantive section addresses a specific circumstance where a volunteer health
care professional renders help to an individual at a school athletic event. Id. § 17–95–101(c).
35 See, e.g., Mueller v. McMillian Warner Ins., 714 N.W.2d 183, 189 (Wis. 2006) (“The
purpose of the [Good Samaritan] statute is to encourage individuals to provide emergency care
to an injured person by immunizing the caregivers from common-law liability if they fail to
exercise reasonable care when rendering emergency care in good faith.”); Swenson v. Waseca
Mut. Ins., 653 N.W.2d 794, 797 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (“The purpose of the [Good Samaritan]
statute is to encourage laypersons to help those in need, even when they are under no legal
obligation to do so, by providing immunity from liability claims arising out of an attempt to
assist a person in peril.” (citation omitted)); Hardingham v. United Counseling Serv., 672 A.2d
480, 483 (Vt. 1995) (explaining how the legislature created the partial immunity under its Duty
to Aid the Endangered Act “largely to allay the litigation fears of medical professionals and
other would-be rescuers.”). In Hardingham, the Vermont Supreme Court further explained that
one of the purposes of its Act is to encourage rescuers to assist others by:

shielding them from civil liability for acts of ordinary negligence committed during the
rescue. If rescuers were forced to go through an expensive trial any time there was the
slightest evidence of ordinary negligence, even if it were clear that gross negligence
was not present, the purpose of the statute would be thwarted.
Id.
36

See ARK. CODE ANN. § 17–95–101(b)(2) (2017).

37

DECHERT LLP, supra note 19, at 3.

38

Id.

39

See ARK. CODE ANN. § 17–95–101(b)(2) (2017).

40

See PLAINTIFF’S PROOF PRIMA FACIE CASE § 13:4 (West 2017).
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effort on the part of the bystander.41 To reiterate, most statutes do not impose any duty
to help on an average bystander.42 The Good Samaritan statute applies only after a
bystander elects to give aid and does so in good faith.43 In sum, these statutes
essentially protect bystanders who help, but generally do not mandate that they must
help.44
B. There Are a Few Good Samaritan Laws That Require a Duty to Aid
Although an overwhelming majority of state statutes do not impose on bystanders
any duty to help,45 a few states have mandated this duty, even if only under very
limited circumstances.46 These states include: Alaska, California, Colorado, Florida,
Hawaii, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, Ohio, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont,
Washington, and Wisconsin.47 Though each statute requires some duty to assist, the
types of duties required generally fall into three categories; from the broadest to the
narrowest, the duties are: (1) a duty to give aid to someone who is in danger; (2) a duty
to give aid to a victim of a crime; and (3) a duty to give aid to a child victim or victim
of a specific crime involving a sexual assault or battery.
1. Duty to Aid an Endangered Person
A few states have expansive duty to assist statutes that require individuals to help
simply when they know that another person is in serious danger and can help without
creating any danger for themselves or others.48 To date, these states include: Vermont,
Minnesota, and Rhode Island.49 For example, Vermont’s duty to assist statute states as
follows:

41

Id.

42

Id.

43

Id.

44

Id.

45

Id.

46

Fifield, supra note 17.

47

ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.765 (2017); CAL. PENAL CODE § 152.3 (West 2017); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 18–8–115 (2017); FLA. STAT. § 794.027 (2017); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663–1.6 (2017);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 268, § 40 (2017); MINN. STAT. § 604A.01 (2017); NEV. REV. STAT. §
202.882 (2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22 (West 2017); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11–56–1
(2017); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.17 (West 2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(a) (2017);
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.69.100 (2017); WIS. STAT. § 940.34(2)(a) (2017).
48 Some states have duty to aid statutes in specific contexts where a person’s actions either
caused or otherwise contributed to the injury or danger. In those cases, the person has a clear
duty to provide assistance to the injured person. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8–1604(a)(2)
(2017) (stating that the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident has a duty to render aid);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41–13–105(a) (2017) (stating that the operator of a watercraft has a duty to
render aid when involved in collision). These statutes are distinct, however, because the
individual’s actions create the duty, not his or her mere knowledge of an injury or presence at
the scene of an emergency.
49

MINN. STAT. § 604A.01 (2017); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11–56–1 (2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, § 519(a) (2017).
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A person who knows that another is exposed to grave physical harm shall,
to the extent that the same can be rendered without danger or peril to
himself or without interference with important duties owed to others, give
reasonable assistance to the exposed person unless that assistance or care is
being provided by others. 50
But some exceptions to this duty exist. For instance, when giving assistance would
cause danger to the person or interfere with duties that person might owe to another,
the person is not obligated to give assistance. 51 Notably, the duty requires that the
person give only “reasonable assistance.”52 Additionally, the penalty for “willfully
violat[ing]” the statute is a nominal fine of not more than $100.53
Minnesota’s and Rhode Island’s duty to assist statutes are substantially similar to
Vermont’s, both requiring that a “person at the scene of an emergency” assist another
person who is “exposed to or has suffered grave physical harm . . . .”54 The Minnesota
statute defines “reasonable assistance” to include the simple step of “obtaining or
attempting to obtain aid from law enforcement or medical personnel.” 55 A person who
violates the Minnesota statute is guilty of a petty misdemeanor, which has a maximum
fine of $300.56 The penalty for violating the Rhode Island statute is slightly greater: a
guilty person may be subject to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, a
maximum fine of $500, or both. 57
The important feature of these three statutes is that they impose on bystanders a
broad duty to give reasonable assistance to anyone who is or might be in danger of
grave physical harm. Bystanders have this duty regardless of whether that harm
resulted from an accident, crime, or other type of emergency.

50 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(a) (2017). In State v. Joyce, the Supreme Court of Vermont
considered the scope of Vermont’s duty to rescue statute in the context of a jury instruction in
a defendant-father’s trial for an assault on his minor child. State v. Joyce, 433 A.2d 271 (Vt.
1981). Five witnesses observed him knocking his son to the ground and repeatedly kicking him
in the side and on the head, but none of them intervened or summoned assistance. Id. at 272–
73. The defendant-father, allegedly intoxicated at the time, argued that his acts must not have
been intentional because if they had been, any reasonable person witnessing the beating would
have intervened. Id. The defendant-father appealed the court’s instruction to the jury that a
bystander had no legal obligation to help. Id. at 273. The Supreme Court of Vermont clarified
that the statute did in fact impose such a duty, but it did not apply in this situation because the
witnesses were not required to intervene in a fight, as the situation presented a “danger or peril”
to the bystanders, an exception under the statute. Id.
51

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(a) (2017).

52

Id.

53

Id. § 519(c).

54

MINN. STAT. § 604A.01(1) (2017); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11–56–1 (2017).

55

MINN. STAT. § 604A.01(1) (2017).

56

Id.; MINN. R. CRIM. PROC. 23.01 (2017).

57

R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11–56–1 (2017).
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2. Duty to Aid a Victim of Any Crime
A few states have more limited duty to assist statutes that mandate individuals help
only when a crime is involved.58 These statutes are less expansive because a person
has no duty to help someone who suffers grave physical harm resulting from an
accident or other danger. 59 The bystander is only obligated to help when that harm is
the result of a crime.60 To date, five states—Colorado, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Ohio,
and Wisconsin—have set out penalties for bystanders who know that a crime is being
committed yet fail to act.61
For example, Colorado’s duty to report a crime statute states that “[i]t is the duty
of every . . . person who has reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been
committed to report promptly the suspected crime to law enforcement authorities.” 62
Hawaii’s duty to assist statute makes it a petty misdemeanor for a person at the
scene of a crime to fail to “obtain aid from law enforcement or medical personnel”
when that person knows that a “victim of [a] crime is suffering from serious physical
harm . . . .”63
Similarly, Wisconsin’s statute, titled Duty to Aid Victim or Report Crime, reads as
follows: “Any person who knows that a crime is being committed and that a victim is
exposed to bodily harm shall summon law enforcement officers or other assistance or
shall provide assistance to the victim.”64
Ohio’s duty to report a crime statute imposes a similar duty to the one imposed in
Wisconsin, but only when the crime is a felony.65 Specifically, Ohio’s statute requires
that any person who “know[s] that a felony has been or is being committed” must
report that information to law enforcement officials. 66 Likewise, Massachusetts has a
statute that requires reporting only serious crimes against the person, such as crimes

58 COLO. REV. STAT. § 18–8–115 (2017); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663–1.6(a) (2017); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 268, § 40 (2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22(A)(1) (West 2017); WIS.
STAT. § 940.34(2)(a) (2017).
59 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18–8–115 (2017); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663–1.6 (2017); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 268, § 40 (2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22(A)(1) (West 2017); WIS.
STAT. § 940.34(2)(a) (2017).
60 E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22(A)(2) (West 2017) (“No person, knowing that a
[felony] has been, or is being committed . . . shall knowingly fail to report [such information]
to law enforcement authorities.”).
61

COLO. REV. STAT. § 18–8–115 (2017); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663–1.6(a) (2017); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 268, § 40 (2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22(A)(1) (West 2017); WIS.
STAT. § 940.34(2)(a) (2017).
62

COLO. REV. STAT. § 18–8–115 (2017).

63 HAW. REV. STAT. § 663–1.6(a) (2017). In State v. Cabral, the Hawaiian Intermediate
Court of Appeals explained how this provision “applies to the perpetrator of the crime as well
as other persons at the scene of a crime.” State v. Cabral, 810 P.3d 672, 677 (Haw. Ct. App.
1991).
64

WIS. STAT. § 940.34(2)(a) (2017).

65

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22(A)(1) (West 2017).

66

Id.
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of “rape, murder, manslaughter or armed robbery . . . .” 67 When a person “is at the
scene of [a] crime” and “knows that another person is a victim of” a serious crime,
that person must “report” it to law enforcement officials “as soon as reasonably
practicable.”68
The Hawaii, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin statutes all provide for explicit
exceptions for situations where complying with the law places the person in danger or
interferes with that person’s duties to another.69
The penalties for violating a duty to aid a crime victim statute typically are
relatively minor, resulting in either a fine or misdemeanor charge. 70 For example, in
Wisconsin, anyone who violates the statute is guilty of a Class C misdemeanor, which
translates into a fine of under “$500 or [an] imprisonment not to exceed [thirty] days,
or both.”71
Interestingly, at least one successful prosecution occurred under Wisconsin’s duty
to aid statute.72 In that case, a jury convicted Karie LaPlante for failing to call for help
and not rendering any aid to a victim—a guest in her home—while seven of her other
guests brutally beat the victim during a party.73 Earlier in the evening, one of the partygoers had told LaPlante that he intended to physically assault the victim.74 LaPlante
witnessed the beating firsthand, but never attempted to aid the victim or summon other
assistance.75 As LaPlante’s failure to act was in direct violation of Wisconsin’s statute,
the state charged and obtained a conviction against her for violating it.76
Though LaPlante challenged her conviction on constitutional grounds, she failed
to show that the statute was either vague or unconstitutional as applied to her.77 The
Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that the statutory duty to aid or report a crime is
quite easy to satisfy, as LaPlante “simply had to call for assistance or render it
herself.”78 Because the statute is “devoid of any mandate that an individual identify
67

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 268, § 40 (2017).

68

Id.

69

HAW. REV. STAT. § 663–1.6(a) (2017) (creating an exception if a person cannot do so
“without danger or peril to any person.”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 268, § 40 (2017) (creating an
exception if person cannot report “without danger or peril to himself or others . . .”); WIS. STAT.
§ 940.34(2)(d)(1) (2017) (stating that a person need not comply if “[c]ompliance would place
him or her in danger.”).
70

E.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 663–1.6(a) (2017) (“Any person who violates this subsection is
guilty of a petty misdemeanor.”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 268, § 40 (2017) (stating that a failure
to report is punished by a fine between $500 and $2,500); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22(I)
(West 2017) (stating that a violation constitutes a misdemeanor of the fourth degree).
71

WIS. STAT. § 939.51(3)(c) (2017).

72

See State v. LaPlante, 521 N.W.2d 448 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994).

73

Id. at 449.

74

Id.

75

Id.

76

Id.

77

Id. at 452.

78

Id.
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oneself when fulfilling the statute’s requirements . . . [b]y calling for help, [she] would
have been under no obligation to provide her name, nor would she have been required
to provide any information as to why the victim was harmed.”79
Had LaPlante fulfilled her simple obligation under the statute, she may have
prevented the crime or mitigated the victim’s injuries. The intention of statutes that
impose a duty to aid a victim of a crime is to encourage bystanders, like LaPlante, to
report criminal activity promptly to law enforcement officials so that such officials
can more effectively investigate, prevent, stop, and prosecute crimes. 80
3. Duty to Aid a Child Victim or Victim of a Sexual Assault or Battery
The most restrictive duty to assist statutes protect only a subset of the more
vulnerable victims in society: child victims or victims of sexual assault and battery.
Texas, Nevada, California, Alaska, Washington, and Florida are the few states that
require bystanders, who otherwise have no statutory, contractual, or other relationship
with the victim, either to assist or report to law enforcement officials when they are
aware or should be aware that a child or another individual is a victim of a crime,
particularly when that crime involves a sexual assault or battery.81
For example, Texas mandates a duty to aid and report in a very specific situation
dealing with a sexual assault of a child.82 The duty arises when an individual observes
a crime against a child or has some reason to believe that a crime has happened or will
happen.83 Specifically, an individual who “observes the commission or attempted
commission” of sexual abuse “under circumstances in which a reasonable person
would believe that an offense of a sexual or assaultive nature was being committed or
was about to be committed against [a] child” must assist that child.84 If that individual
fails to help the child or immediately report what he or she knows to the proper
authorities, he or she will have violated the statute and will be guilty of a
misdemeanor.85
Likewise, Nevada makes failing to report a violent or sexual offense against a child
who is twelve years old or younger a misdemeanor. 86 Therefore, any “person who
79

Id.

80

See, e.g., 1973 LEGIS. SERV. COMM’N REP., reprinted in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22
(West 2017) (“The rationale for requiring that serious crimes be reported is that effective crime
prevention and law enforcement depend significantly on the cooperation of the public.”).
81

Most states have duty to report requirements for individuals who have or create some
contractual or other relationship with the victim. See Marin Roger Scordato, Understanding the
Absence of a Duty to Reasonably Rescue in American Tort Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1447, 1459–
63 (2008). The Texas, Nevada, California, Alaska, Washington, and Florida statutes are unique
in that they impose the duty on someone who would not otherwise be obligated to help. ALASKA
STAT. § 11.56.765 (2017); CAL. PENAL CODE § 152.3 (West 2017); FLA. STAT. § 794.027 (2017);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.882 (2017); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.17 (West 2017); WASH. REV.
CODE § 9.69.100 (2017).
82

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.17(a)(1) (West 2017).

83

Id.

84

Id.

85

Id. § 38.17(b).

86

NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.882(1)–(2).
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knows or has reasonable cause to believe that another person has committed a violent
or sexual offense against a child” must report the offense to a law enforcement
agency.87 The statute mandates that the person report “as reasonably practicable but
not later than [twenty-four] hours” after learning of the offense.88 Unlike other statutes,
Nevada’s statute specifies the type of information that the person must report.89 The
report must include the names of the victim-child and perpetrator, the location of the
offense, and any “facts and circumstances which support the person’s belief that the
violent or sexual offense was committed.”90
California’s statute imposes a similar duty to Nevada’s with respect to childvictims, but includes crimes other than sexual assault within its ambit. In California,
when a person “reasonably believes that he or she has observed the commission” of a
murder, rape, or other similar offense, and the “victim is a child under [fourteen] years
of age,” that person must notify a “peace officer.”91 Similarly, in Alaska, a person who
“witnesses what the person knows or reasonably should know” is a violent crime
against a child under sixteen years of age must “report that crime to a peace officer or
law enforcement agency” in a “timely manner.” 92 The statute lists murder, attempted
murder, kidnapping, attempted kidnapping, sexual penetration, attempted sexual
penetration, and assault as violent crimes.93
Washington’s duty to report statute applies broadly to any victim of a violent
offense as well as specifically to sexual offenses against a child, particularly if an
assault “appears reasonably likely to cause substantial bodily harm to the child . . . .”94
Any person “who witnesses the actual commission” of the crime must “notify the
prosecuting attorney, law enforcement, medical assistance, or other public officials”
“as soon as reasonably possible.”95
Finally, Florida’s duty to report a sexual battery statute applies to a victim of any
age, not just a child victim.96 So long as the person “[h]as reasonable grounds to
believe that he or she has observed the commission of a sexual battery,” that person
must seek assistance for the victim or immediately report the offense to law
enforcement officials.97

87

Id. § 202.882(1).

88

Id. § 202.882(1)(b).

89

Id. § 202.882(3)(a)–(c).

90

Id. § 202.882(3)(c).

91

CAL. PENAL CODE § 152.3(a)(1)–(3) (West 2017). The California Penal Code defines
“peace officer” to include officials employed or appointed by public safety agencies, such as
sheriffs, marshals, and police. Id. § 830.1(a).
92

ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.765 (2017).

93

Id. § 11.56.765(a)(1)(A)–(D).

94

WASH. REV. CODE § 9.69.100(1)(c) (2017).

95

Id. § 9.69.100(1)–(1)(c).

96

FLA. STAT. § 794.027 (2017).

97

Id. § 794.027(1)–(2).
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These statutes generally have exceptions if the bystander or the bystander’s family
would be exposed to danger or threat of physical harm. 98 A failure to report under
these statutes is typically a misdemeanor punishable by a fine, imprisonment in jail
for less than six months, or a combination of both. 99 For example, the California statute
makes a “[f]ailure to notify . . . a misdemeanor . . . punishable by a fine of not more
than [$1,500], by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than six months, or by
both . . . .”100
The common thread to these statutes is the intent to encourage the public to report
crimes that involve victims who might not be able to report on their own or might be
afraid to report by virtue of their age or the impact the sexual assault or battery has
had on their willingness and ability to do so. Moreover, crimes of sexual assault or
battery are crimes that often involve perpetrators who are known to the victim and
therefore have a likelihood of being repeated.101 Thus, society has a great need for the
public to step in and aid to prevent further victimization, particularly when a child is
involved. Though this category of duty to aid statutes serves an important interest, it
is limited in application and certainly not as far-reaching as the general duty to aid
statutes of Vermont, Rhode Island, and Minnesota, which encourage public
involvement irrespective of the cause of harm, the type of harm, or the age of the
victim.102
II. OBJECTIONS TO DUTY TO AID STATUTES
Although fourteen states have legislated some form of duty to aid statute, most
states have not and do not seem to have any real momentum to do so.103 Of the minority
98 ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.765(b)(1) (2017) (creating an exception if “the defendant
reasonably believed that [reporting] would have exposed the defendant or others to a substantial
risk of physical injury . . . .”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 152.3(e)(3) (West 2017) (creating an
exception for “[a] person who fails to report based on a reasonable fear for his or her own safety
or for the safety of his or her family.”); FLA. STAT. § 794.027(4) (2017) (creating an exception
if seeking assistance would “expose[]” that person to “any threat of physical violence . . . .”);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.888(4) (2017) (creating an exception for a person who “[k]nows or has
reasonable cause to believe that reporting” would place the person or relative or any person
residing in the same household of the person “in imminent danger of suffering substantial bodily
harm.”); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.69.100(4) (2017) (creating an exception for a person who has
“a reasonable belief that making such a report would place that person or another family or
household member in danger of immediate physical harm.”).
99 ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.765(d) (2017) (“Failure to report a violent crime committed
against a child is a class A misdemeanor.”); FLA. STAT. § 794.027(6) (2017) (stating that failure
to seek assistance amounts to a misdemeanor of the first degree); WASH. REV. CODE §
9.69.100(4) (2017) (stating that failure to notify constitutes “a gross misdemeanor”).
100

CAL. PENAL CODE § 152.3(d) (West 2017).

101 Myths
and
Facts
About
Sexual
Violence,
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/campus-life/advising-counseling/personalcounseling/sarvl/general-information.cfm (last visited Jan. 14, 2018).
102

GEO.

L.,

See discussion supra Section I.A.

103

However, after national public outrage over tragedies like in Chicago and Florida, there
was a renewed discussion concerning whether laws should require a duty to rescue. See, e.g.,
Gil Smart, Opinion, After Cocoa Drowning Case, Do We Need ‘Duty to Rescue’ Law?, USA
TODAY (July 26, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2017/07/26/smart-aftercocoa-drowning-case-do-we-need-duty-rescue-law/511851001/ (stating that Cocoa Police
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of states that have legislated a duty to aid statute, only three—Vermont, Rhode Island,
and Minnesota—have statutes that are broad enough to require that a bystander render
aid when that bystander witnesses either a crime or an accident that exposes another
to grave physical harm.104 In other words, the Vermont, Rhode Island, and Minnesota
statutes are the only statutes that would penalize both the online spectators who did
nothing to help stop the sexual assault of the fifteen-year-old girl in Chicago and the
teenagers who failed to give any aid to the drowning disabled man in Florida.
Although some of the remaining eleven duty to aid statutes might have applied to
the online spectators to the sexual assault of the female minor, none of them would
have applied to the teenage witnesses to the disabled man’s drowning death.105 The
limited reach of existing duty to aid statutes and the absence of any duty to aid
requirement in the majority of other states reflect the prevailing view that our laws
should not regulate morality, and if they do, they should do so cautiously and
sparingly.106
Supporters of this prevailing view insist that failing to come to the aid of another
should not result in any liability, absent some relationship, contractual duty, or other
obligation.107 Even though good moral behavior might dictate otherwise, such as
where the Florida teenagers could have easily contacted emergency personnel to help
save the drowning disabled man, the law should not impose on others that morality.
Morality should come from within, not from the force of law. 108
This distinction between what might be morally right and what should be a legal
obligation is rooted in precedent dating back over a century. 109 One early judicial

Chief announced that he will be working with the County Sheriff and other law enforcement
leaders on “efforts to push for [a] new state law focusing on ‘not rendering aid’ to someone in
distress.”).
104

See discussion supra Section I.A.

105 Obviously, this result is peculiar because the teenagers’ conduct was just as, if not more
than, morally reprehensible as the online spectators to the sexual assault, as the teenagers’ aid
might have prevented the man’s death altogether.
106 McCall C. Carter, Morality, Law and the Duty to Act: Creating a Common Law Duty to
Act Modeled After the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine, 2 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 138, 150
(2010).
107 For example, duties brought about by contract or special relationships, such as parent to
child, employer to employee, and host to social guest, are acceptable. Jessica R. Givelber,
Imposing Duties on Witnesses to Child Sexual Abuse: A Futile Response to Bystander
Indifference, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3169, 3179 (1999).
108 See Kathleen M Ridolfi, Law, Ethics, and the Good Samaritan: Should There Be a Duty
to Rescue?, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 957, 960 (2000) (exploring the debate over morality and
autonomy raised by Good Samaritan laws and explaining how punishing an omission amounts
to the state “monitoring an individual’s personal moral code.”). Scholars also are concerned that
legislating morality “would destabilize written law by replacing it with the varied morals of
those sitting on the bench.” Carl V. Nowlin, Don’t Just Stand There, Help Me!: Broadening the
Effect of Minnesota’s Good Samaritan Immunity Through Swenson v. Waseca Mutual
Insurance Co., 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1001, 1004 (2004) (footnote omitted) (discussing
Minnesota’s civil immunity provision through an examination of the Swenson decision).
109

See, e.g., Depue v. Flateau, 111 N.W. 1 (Minn. 1907).
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decision by the Minnesota Supreme Court clearly delineated between good morals and
legal obligations, stating:
Those duties which are dictated merely by good morals or by humane
considerations are not within the domain of the law. Feelings of kindness
and sympathy may move the Good Samaritan to minister to the sick and
wounded at the roadside, but the law imposes no such obligation; and
suffering humanity has no legal complaint against those who pass by on the
other side.110
As such, the law should not impose moral duties on the “general public.” 111 An
individual should owe a moral duty only when the person owes a duty to the victim
“in an individual capacity”—that is, through a contractual or other relationship.112
Accordingly, the law should excuse:
all failures to observe the obligations imposed by charity, gratitude,
generosity, and the kindred virtues. The moral law would obligate an
attempt to rescue a person in a perilous position—as a drowning child—
but the law of the land does not require it, no matter how little personal risk
it might involve, provided that the person who declines to act is not
responsible for the peril.113
The principal argument that the law should not require others to act with “charity,
gratitude, generosity, and the kindred virtues”114 when another person is in obvious
need of help is the preservation of personal autonomy.115 In the United States, citizens
value individual rights, including the freedom to pursue one’s own interests and the
freedom of privacy, above a general responsibility to the community. 116 These rights
are paramount to an individual’s freedom to move around, interact with others, and do
as he or she pleases.117 “[C]hoosing whether or not to perform a good deed is a personal
110 Id. at 2 (citing Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cappier, 72 P. 281 (Kan. 1903)) (explaining
circumstances that might give rise to a duty to help a sick individual). This view still prevails
today. For example, a more recent decision by the Arizona Court of Appeals explained how
“there is no duty to rescue an endangered stranger.” Miller v. Arnal Corp., 632 P.2d 987, 994
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (finding no basis upon which to hold a ski resort liable for interfering with
or preventing a rescue because it had no legal duty to aid the stranded hikers).
111 Union Pac. Ry. Co., 72 P. at 283 (holding that a railway company had no legal duty to
aid a trespasser who was injured while on the company’s track despite the ability to do so).
112

Id.

113 Id. (first quoting BARROWS ON NEGLIGENCE 4; then citing Kenney v. Hannibal & St.
Joseph R.R., 70 Mo. 252, 252–57 (Mo. 1879)).
114

Id.

115

Alison M. Arcuri, Comment, Sherrice Iverson Act: Duty to Report Child Abuse and
Neglect, 20 PACE L. REV. 471, 476 (2000) (“In a democratic society, the basic and most obvious
argument against forcing people to help others is that such a law will interfere with an
individual’s freedom and privacy.” (footnote omitted)).
116

See Ridolfi, supra note 108, at 960–61.

117

See Philip W. Romohr, A Right/Duty Perspective on the Legal and Philosophical
Foundations of the No-Duty-to-Rescue Rule, 55 DUKE L.J. 1025, 1042 (2006).
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decision, a private matter for an individual and [his or] her conscience . . . .” 118 Thus,
a rule that would require individuals to put others’ interests above their own would
seriously undermine the principle of personal autonomy. 119
Opponents to duty to aid laws would argue that the personal autonomy principle
should take precedent,120 especially when such laws aim to punish nonfeasance, not
misfeasance—the key to liability for negligent and criminal acts in United States
law.121 To hold a person liable for an act under United States law, that person must
have had a duty to the victim and breached that duty through some overt or affirmative
action.122 An omission normally does not suffice for a finding of liability.123 For that
reason, punishing nonfeasance and misfeasance are different. In cases where a person
does not act affirmatively, such as with nonfeasance, the law should respect that
person’s personal autonomy rather than punish it.124 That is, “when one merely allows
harm to happen, instead of consciously causing it to happen, one’s personal autonomy
should not be violated by the imposition of liability.”125
In addition to respecting personal autonomy, opponents to imposing liability for
failing to act argue that imposing liability would be unfair to those who decide not to
act for reasons other than a lack of good morals. 126 Individuals have very “specific,
personal reasons to avoid attempting to rescue someone, and therefore it would be
unfair to require it of the public at large.” 127 For example, a bystander might decide
not to act because he or she is not certain as to the danger or is not totally aware of the
pressing need for help, either because the bystander is distracted or the situation is
ambiguous. Though the Florida teenagers’ recorded comments suggest otherwise, this
could have been true for the drowning disabled man, where initially the bystanders
might have been uncertain or confused as to whether the man was joking, splashing
118 Ridolfi, supra note 108, at 961 (“[T]o invade [the] sphere [of one’s conscience] is a threat
to individual autonomy.”).
119

Jay Logan Rogers, Testing the Waters for an Arizona Duty-to-Rescue Law, 56 ARIZ. L.
REV. 897, 904–05 (2014) (explaining how duty to rescue statutes “would undermine key values
and ideals of our society, including personal autonomy.”).
120

Ridolfi, supra note 108, at 960–61.

121 See Marcia M. Ziegler, Comment, Nonfeasance and the Duty to Assist: The American
Seinfeld Syndrome, 104 DICK. L. REV. 525, 536–37 (2000) (advocating for a reasonableness
analysis in duty to assist cases to determine civil liability in cases of nonfeasance and
acknowledging “that there is a grave distinction between causing harm and failing to prevent
harm.” (footnote omitted)).
122 See Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cappier, 72 P. 281, 283 (Kan. 1903) (holding that a railway
company had no legal duty to aid a trespasser who was injured while on the company’s track
despite ability to do so); Ziegler, supra note 121, at 533.
123

See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 768.13 (2017); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 49/1 et seq. (2018).

124

Ziegler, supra note 121, at 536–37.

125

Id.

126 See Thomas G. Amason, The Sherrice Iverson Act: Creating a Duty to Report the Sexual
Abuse of Children, 23 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 153, 160 (1999) (explaining reasons why people
do not or are unwilling to report crimes).
127

Rogers, supra note 119, at 905.
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around, or truly struggling to stay afloat. This ambiguity weighs against imposing
liability.
Additionally, a bystander might find difficulty in assessing how to rescue or give
aid to the victim. Some people have a “genetic or psychological predisposition to
‘freeze up’ in an emergency.”128 When a situation has more than one bystander,
deciding whether and how to act may become even more difficult, as multiple potential
rescuers usually result in a diffusion of responsibility and confusion over who will
take the lead in calling for aid or beginning the rescue. 129 Finally, it would be unfair to
require action from a person who might be afraid to help or reluctant to contact
authorities out of a mistrust of law enforcement or other fear, such as revealing an
illegal immigration status.130
Opponents to imposing liability for failing to act also express concerns about
worsening the emergency and exposing the bystanders themselves to physical harm
or other danger.131 In other words, duty to aid laws might encourage bystanders to give
aid when they are ill-equipped to do so, potentially increasing the risk not only to
themselves but also to the victims.132 Likewise, bystanders might take unnecessary or
foolish risks, which also is counterproductive.133 While medical and other emergency
personnel are trained to handle emergency situations, the average person is not.
Therefore, “rescue efforts may go awry and place the victims in greater peril, [and]
they may also turn out badly for the rescuers themselves, causing them harm.”134
Moreover, a frequent critique of duty to aid laws is the problem of enforcement. 135
Detecting violations of the laws would be difficult and, in many cases, impossible. For
instance, a bystander who chooses not to rescue is unlikely to report his or own refusal
to help someone in danger. “[A] third party may be reluctant to report someone else’s
failure” because doing so might expose that person to similar liability136 or result in
the unpleasant stigma of snitching.137 Consequently, “the often undetectable nature of
possible defendants diminishes . . . the practical effect of an affirmative duty-to-rescue
rule.”138
128

Id. (citing Scordato, supra note 81, at 1484–84).

129

Id. at 908.

130 Id. at 922–23 (discussing how one possible consequence of a duty to aid law is the
reporting of and identifying the illegal status of an individual but concluding that, in cases of
dangerous harm, that consequence is preferred over death or serious injury).
131

Scordato, supra note 81, at 1476.

132

Id.

133

Id. at 1476–77.

134

Id. at 1476 (footnote omitted).

135

Rogers, supra note 119, at 910 (citing Hyman, supra note 15, at 656).

136

Id. at 911.

137

Maura Dolan, ‘Good Samaritan’ Laws Are Hard to Enact, Experts Say, L.A. TIMES (Sept.
9, 1998), http://articles.latimes.com/1998/sep/09/news/mn-20995 (explaining one concern with
a duty to report is “that we don’t want, as a matter of law, to turn into informants on each [other]
. . . .” (quoting Arthur Leavens, a professor at Western New England College School of Law)).
138

Scordato, supra note 81, at 1454, 1468 (arguing “that a general duty to affirmatively aid
in tort law would generate far more costs than it would provide corresponding benefits.”).
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Similarly, investigating, arresting, and adjudicating violators comes with a cost,
and that cost is higher when the evidence is lacking or circumstantial.139 Depending
on the wording of the law, police would need to show that the violator knew almost
certainly that a crime was occurring or danger of physical harm was present.140 Indeed,
it is likely that only the most egregious violations would be brought to the attention of
police. Therefore, because many violations might go undetected and unpunished, an
intrinsic unfairness underlies how states would apply the laws. 141
Lastly, opponents argue that the instances of bystanders failing to act are too
infrequent to warrant creating laws imposing liability. 142 “Bad Samaritanism,” as some
refer to it,143 is “extraordinarily rare.”144 The extremely low number of prosecutions
under bad Samaritan laws in the few states that have them proves that failure to act
situations are quite uncommon.145 Accordingly, the bystanders’ omissions in both the
Chicago and Florida cases are not the norm. Given this reality, duty to act laws likely
would not have had any effect on the online spectators’ or teenagers’ behavior in those
cases:
[N]ot all persons who would choose not to reasonably aid another in the
absence of a coercive legal rule would necessarily respond by engaging in
the socially desired behavior when faced with the threat of tort law liability.
After all, much more severe consequences now exist for those found guilty
of homicide, armed robbery, and other serious crimes, and yet people
continue to commit those crimes.146
Given the infrequency of egregious failures to act and the questionable effect any law
would have on changing behavior in those situations, efforts to establish duty to aid
laws might be futile.
III. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS DEMAND LAWS IMPOSING A DUTY TO AID
The idea that states should make an individual come to the aid of another, even in
the absence of a relationship or other contractual obligation, is not new, nor is the idea
unsupported by legal precedent. Indeed, one legal scholar dating back to the early
1900s advocated for such a change in the law:

139

Arcuri, supra note 115, at 478 (asserting that there is an “inherent difficulty in
ascertaining who, if anyone, violated [these] types of law[s].”).
140

Dolan, supra note 137.

141

Arcuri, supra note 115, at 480–81; see also Amason, supra note 126, at 165 (explaining
how “selective enforcement” may raise discrimination claims as well).
142

Hyman, supra note 15, at 656.

143 See, e.g., Jennifer Bagby, Justifications for State Bystander Intervention Statutes: Why
Crime Witnesses Should Be Required to Call for Help, 33 IND. L. REV. 571, 578–79 (2000).
144

Hyman, supra note 15, at 656 (providing the first empirical study of the no-duty rule in
action and finding that proven cases of non-rescues are “extraordinarily rare” and, on the flip
side, proven cases of rescues are “exceedingly common”).
145

Id.

146

Scordato, supra note 81, at 1467–68 (footnote omitted).
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As the law stands today there would be no legal liability, either civilly or
criminally, in [failure to act] cases. The law does not compel active
benevolence between man and man. It is left to one’s conscience whether
he shall be the good Samaritan or not.
But ought the law to remain in this condition? Of course any statutory duty
to be benevolent would have to be exceptional. The practical difficulty in
such legislation would be in drawing the line. But that difficulty has
continually to be faced in the law. We should all be better satisfied if the
man who refuses to throw a rope to a drowning man or to save a helpless
child on the railroad track could be punished . . . .147
The inability to punish those who fail to throw a rope to a drowning man or save a
helpless child on the railroad track creates a “void in the law.”148 The results can be
disturbing, as are the cases with the online spectators of the sexual assault of the minor
in Chicago and teenage witnesses to the drowning death of the disabled man in Florida,
all of whom faced no penalties whatsoever for their unsympathetic inaction. Thus, this
void makes deterring the callousness and selfishness of individuals impossible.149 In
other words, no legal deterrent exists for those who stand by and do nothing while
others suffer. This counters an important moral principle in United States law: the
respect for and preservation of human life.150
While opponents might be reluctant to legislate morality or restrict an individual’s
personal autonomy, existing laws already do just that. For example, society believes
taking the life of another is morally wrong, and therefore the law punishes doing so in
the harshest of ways.151 Society also believes taking the property of another is wrong;
therefore, the law criminalizes theft and other property offenses.152 Society further
believes that children and the mentally disabled, for example, are some of the most
vulnerable members of the community; consequently, the legislature has enacted
special laws to protect them.153 These laws exist to prevent harm and, in doing so, they
naturally regulate personal freedoms:
The law regulates personal freedom by imposing duties and extending
liberties. The law also confers rights against one’s fellow citizens; it
protects citizens by prohibiting one from exercising their personal liberties

147

James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97, 112–13 (1908) (positing a
simple “working rule” that would obligate Good Samaritans to help even if they are not
responsible in any way for the perilous situation).
148 Amason, supra note 126, at 156 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Dolan, supra
note 137).
149

Bagby, supra note 143, at 583 (arguing that a duty to rescue statute would serve to “deter
antisocial behavior”).
150

Id. (citing JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 175 (1984)).

151

See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (2017).

152

See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 641 (2017).

153

See Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Reform, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101–
08 (2017); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (2009).
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to the detriment of others. While a presumption in favor of liberty exists,
certain societal interests justify limiting personal liberty.154
Thus, a duty to aid statute would not be unique in reflecting societal morals and values
nor in restricting personal autonomy. Given the immorality in watching another die or
suffer serious physical harm, laws should encourage the right moral response. 155 This
would be a natural extension of “the life-affirming values that our criminal laws . . .
represent: community togetherness, and recognition and appreciation of our common
humanity.”156 These values are just as important as preserving personal autonomy. A
duty to aid statute can easily balance these principles by requiring bystanders to help
only when they can and punishing those who willfully choose to do nothing or instead
objectify or exploit the victim.
Such a statute would not only promote good morals, but also would help change
social norms and societal expectations for intervention. 157 A duty to aid statute would
“legally codify the notion that people have a civic responsibility to look out for one
another.”158 Consequently, bystanders would feel an increased personal responsibility
to act, helping to counter the problems of bystander apathy and diffusion of
responsibility that often arise when many bystanders are present.159
Moreover, in cases of bad Samaritanism, the failure to act is an act of misfeasance,
not nonfeasance, as opponents suggest. 160 A bystander who witnesses a crime or
accident and fails to use his or her power to intervene has affected the result on the
victim of that crime or accident. As one author explains:
A bystander who witnesses a crime upon a victim has the power to affect
the situation and the crime in progress by notifying the authorities or
directly assisting the victim. If the bystander does nothing, the resulting

154

Bagby, supra note 143, at 581 (citing FEINBERG, supra note 150, at 8, 10).

155

Rogers, supra note 119, at 903 (proposing Arizona enact a criminal statute that imposes
a fine on witnesses to crimes who fail to call for help or attempt to rescue the victim and arguing
that such a law would be “more harmonious with basic principles of morality and justice.”
(footnote omitted)).
156 Ken Levy, Killing, Letting Die, and the Case for Mildly Punishing Bad Samaritanism,
44 GA. L. REV. 607, 628 (2010) (footnote omitted) (failing to act is “so morally wrong that the
state should severely punish it.”).
157

Jay Silver, The Duty to Rescue: A Reexamination and Proposal, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV.
423, 429 (1985) (rebutting many arguments against a duty to rescue statute). The “law not only
reflects society’s moral values, but also helps shape them.” Id. “Accordingly, a legal duty to
rescue would increase the number of persons who feel morally compelled to offer emergency
aid.” Id.; see Bagby, supra note 143, at 583 (“One reason people do not render assistance is that
they perceive no societal expectation to do so. Bystanders are acting in accordance with the
social norm of no intervention.”).
158

Rogers, supra note 119, at 903.

159

Bagby, supra note 143, at 585–86 (explaining how the duty would normalize
responsibility of bystanders).
160 In any event, laws do punish pure acts of omission. Failure to file one’s tax return is just
one example. See Silver, supra note 157, at 430 (arguing that “despite dicta to the contrary,
omissions have long served as a basis for liability in our system.”).
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harm to the victim is a consequence of the bystander’s decision not to use
this power to intervene.
Not only is the harm that results to the victim connected to the bystander’s
failure to intervene, but the bystander’s failure to intervene is also a
“causally relevant factor” in the resulting harm to the victim. Failing to
summon the authorities on behalf of the victim is not the sole cause for the
resulting harm . . . [h]owever, [it] plays a relevant role in the harm that
results.161
Consequently, the affirmative decision not to intervene is an act of misfeasance that
should be punishable.
This misfeasance is even more apparent in a situation where the bystander has
engaged in some way with the victim of the crime or danger, as the teenagers did with
the drowning disabled man in Florida. There, the teenagers were, as one scholar
describes, “engaged spectators”162 because they mocked and taunted the man as they
filmed his death. Engaged spectators are “those who choose to lock their attention on
the scene . . . .”163 “Use of technology, such as taking a cell phone picture [or video
recording], is one indication that the bystander” has become an engaged spectator,
“directly engaging not only the scene of an accident or an assault, but also in some
way the vulnerable person.”164
In these cases, the bystander has taken steps “to objectify, humiliate and exploit a
victim at his or her most vulnerable moment.” 165 This is undoubtedly an affirmative,
overt act. To be sure:
Those who decide to stop, focus and engage an emergency scene, and to
use their cell phones to record images of a victim at the site of an assault or
an accident, have a moral obligation to treat the victim with dignity, which
includes neither objectifying nor exploiting their vulnerability. 166
The law should translate that moral obligation into a legal one.
A civic justification supports such a law as well. Individuals should assist the
criminal justice system by notifying the police with information about crimes. 167 “By
requiring bystanders to notify the authorities, the criminal justice system is able to
fulfill its role in aiding the victims of crime and stopping criminal acts.”168 A
161

Bagby, supra note 143, at 582 (quoting FEINBERG, supra note 150, at 174).

162

Uelmen, supra note 15, at 92.

163

Id. In contrast, “pure bystanders” are “bystanders who pass by or otherwise disengage
from the scene of an assault or accident . . . .” Id.
164

Id. at 108.

165

Id.

166

Id. (footnote omitted).

167

Bagby, supra note 143, at 579–81 (explaining social justifications for bystander
intervention statutes). “Creation of [bystander intervention] statute[s] would give legal effect to
an already existing shared principle that we should help those in distress.” Id. at 580. The
statutes would also “serve the civic duty of assisting law enforcement.” Id. at 581.
168

Id.
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requirement likewise “will provide an incentive for citizens to help strangers in peril,
thereby leading to the desirable public policy outcome of a greater number of
endangered people being rescued.”169 “[L]ives would be saved and injuries
avoided.”170 Therefore, a duty to aid statute has the practical effect of “minimiz[ing]
needless deaths and injuries,” not increasing them. 171
Additionally, even if bad Samaritan situations like the ones in Chicago and Florida
rarely happen, a duty to aid law would make a clear “statement that [society] find[s] .
. . inaction and indifference to a fellow human being to be morally despicable” and
every citizen has “a strong affirmative moral duty to attempt easy rescues rather than
turning a blind eye to people [they] happen to find in grave danger.” 172 This statement
is imperative to addressing the impact that social media has had on a bystander’s
ability and decision to give aid.
A well-drafted law with explicit obligations and reasonable exceptions can address
the remaining objections to duty to aid statutes, including those relating to fairness,
safety, and enforcement. The law would need to be a criminal one that requires
notification to authorities and nothing more. 173 Though the statute could encourage
bystanders to either report or rescue, rescue should be optional, not mandatory. The
only duty would be to notify authorities when someone needs help.174 Because of “the
prevalence of cellular phones and the well-established and efficient emergency
response services found throughout the [United States]” today, this requirement

169 Rogers, supra note 119, at 903 (first citing Levy, supra note 156, at 627; then citing Liam
Murphy, Beneficence, Law and Liberty: The Case of Required Rescue, 89 GEO. L.J. 605 (2001)).
170

Silver, supra note 157, at 428.

171 Levy, supra note 156, at 627, 626–29 (explaining the utilitarian reasons for criminalizing
bad Samaritanism). One utilitarian reason is “to provide society an outlet for its moral outrage”
and allow people to “enjoy” a “sense of justice” when someone who acts with “inhumane
indifference” is punished. Id. at 627–28 (arguing that the public would have taken satisfaction
in punishing David Cash—a model of bad Samaritanism—for failing to intervene and prevent
Sherrice Iverson’s brutal sexual assault and murder).
172

Id. at 684 (footnote omitted).

173 This Article does not explore whether there should be a civil counterpart to the criminal
duty. See, e.g., Marc A. Franklin & Matthew Ploeger, Of Rescue and Report: Should Tort Law
Impose a Duty to Help Endangered Persons or Abused Children?, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
991 (2000) (arguing that there should be no civil duty of easy rescue).
174 Bagby, supra note 143, at 587 (proposing that a duty to report crime statute would be
“easily fulfilled”). “To fulfill the duty, the bystander [would] need only summon the authorities
to the crime scene by dialing 911 or using an alternative method. No special skills, medical or
otherwise, are required to notify the authorities.” Id. Accordingly, it would not require “the
heroism of invulnerability and infantile omnipotence.” Daniel B. Yeager, A Radical Community
of Aid: A Rejoinder to Opponents of Affirmative Duties to Help Strangers, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1,
8, 24–25 (1993) (criticizing “the common notion that affirmative duties are intolerable because
they threaten autonomy.”).
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should be easy to meet.175 This obligation presents a minimal burden on the bystander
but could be the “difference between life and death for the . . . victim.” 176
Moreover, if the situation were unclear to the bystander, all he or she would need
to do is contact authorities and report the possible crime or potential danger. The
authorities would bear the ultimate responsibility of determining whether the situation
involves an actual crime or real danger. Interestingly, knowing that a law would
penalize them for failing to report might create an incentive for people to be more
aware of their surroundings, ultimately leading to more, not less, aid to victims. 177
Because reporting would be the only requirement, a bystander should not freeze
up or be confused about what to do. 178 Society also should not be concerned that a
bystander will undertake reckless or dangerous rescues. The more prevalent duty to
aid statutes become, the more people will be educated on rescue and therefore will be
able to give aid appropriately.179 The reporting itself can be done anonymously to
dispel any fears over the bystander’s privacy or personal well-being.
Exceptions for situations where reporting or rescuing would be dangerous or
unnecessary would ensure that any duty to aid law was reasonable and fair. To that
end, the law would not punish a bystander who does not report or give aid because
doing so would expose the bystander to grave physical harm or other danger or
because others are already providing reasonable assistance.180 Because reporting is so
simple and does not need to take place at the scene of the crime or emergency,
imagining a situation where doing so would pose any risk to the bystander is difficult.
Nonetheless, the law would include an exception for those who could not report safely.
For the law to have an impact on a bystander’s decision to intervene, the penalties
for failing to act must be substantial, though obviously not oppressive:
If the penalty is set too low, the statute will only serve as a type of moral
compass, and the law will likely go unenforced. If the penalty is set too
high, the public is likely to recoil from the idea that failure to report a crime
should be a criminal offense. Additionally, if the penalty is set too high, the
enforcement agencies of the states could be deluged with calls reporting
175

Damien Schiff, Samaritans: Good, Bad and Ugly: A Comparative Law Analysis, 11
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 77, 124–25, 138 (2005) (proposing a model penal statute imposing
a duty to inform authorities or professional rescue personnel in emergencies).
176 Arcuri, supra note 115, at 472 (supporting duty to report federal legislation in honor of
Sherrice Iverson, a child victim of a brutal sexual assault and murder that a bystander, David
Cash, had the ability to prevent, but did not).
177

Rogers, supra note 119, at 913.

178

Jack Wenik, Forcing the Bystander to Get Involved: A Case for a Statute Requiring
Witnesses to Report Crime, 94 YALE L.J. 1787, 1800, 1803 (1985) (proposing a duty to report
penal law but limiting it to witnesses to felonies who fail to report as to avoid “overbroad
coverage” of such a law). A duty to aid statute would “combat[] indecision through its provision
of an accepted course of action and its explicit determination that a decision to ignore crime is
wrong and socially unacceptable.” Id. at 1803.
179 Levy, supra note 156, at 685 (“[B]ad-Samaritan laws might actually reduce the number
of . . . tragic rescue attempts by educating the public about when they should, and when they
should not, attempt rescues.”).
180

See generally Silver, supra note 157, at 442–43 (discussing these two proposed defenses
to liability).
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noncrimes because the population fears prosecution themselves. The
penalty should reflect the idea that [the] statute is likely to be used when
someone falls short of being considered an accessory . . . .181
A misdemeanor charge imposing a fine of up to $2,500, imprisonment for up to one
year, or both would suffice to achieve this result. 182 Importantly, “if someone had
major ideological or psychological reasons for not engaging in a rescue attempt, the
consequences of noncompliance with [the] law would not be debilitating for that
person.”183
Moreover, prosecutors would have the discretion “to dismiss a technical duty-torescue violation in a case with significant mitigating factors.”184 They also would have
the discretion to bring “to bear [the statutes] against a defendant who has failed to
affirmatively aid only in those situations in which the defendant’s failure to act
warrants prosecution, such as if he has exhibited exceptional callousness or
unquestionably reprehensible conduct.”185 Prosecutors could seek the maximum
penalties for “engaged spectators,” like those in the Chicago and Florida cases.
“Similarly, prosecutors can choose to pursue only those cases that are most likely to
send a positive message about reasonable rescue to the public at large without unduly
aggravating its possible costs.”186 Provided that the choice to pursue a case does not
involve impermissible discrimination, this selectivity is not unfair or prohibited.187
Rather, the selectivity is an efficient and appropriate use of law enforcement and
judicial resources.
Enforcement, while not perfect, would be achievable as well. Law enforcement, as
in any criminal matter, might learn through an investigation that someone was present
and could have helped. Moreover, with social media, cell phones, and other
technological devices, identifying witnesses who have failed to assist might not be as
difficult as doing so would have been in the past.188 In fact, social media documentary
evidence helped identify the online spectators in Chicago and teenage witnesses in
Florida.189 Therefore, the difficulty of detection is not insurmountable, particularly
when considering that this problem of detection is one that law enforcement tackles
for all crimes. Thus, a duty to aid statute does not present a unique circumstance.
181 Amason, supra note 126, at 164 (footnotes omitted) (discussing drafting issues for duty
to report statutes).
182

Silver, supra note 157, at 438 (arguing that a similar proposed penalty is “not excessive,
yet strong enough that the duty will be taken seriously”).
183

Rogers, supra note 119, at 920 (footnote omitted).

184

Id. at 907 (footnote omitted).

185

Scordato, supra note 81, at 1497–98.

186

Id. at 1498 (citing Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985)).

187

Wenik, supra note 178, at 1805.

188

Breanna Trombley, Criminal Law—No Stitches for Snitches: The Need for a Duty-toReport Law in Arkansas, 34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 813, 828 (arguing for a duty to report
statute in Arkansas and explaining how the number of witnesses present and cell phones used
to capture parts of an attack on a high school student increases the likelihood that law
enforcement can identify bystanders).
189

Chokshi, supra note 6.
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Finally, even if the instances of Bad Samaritanism are low and the number of
reported cases under existing statutes is almost zero, the symbolic message that such
statutes could send to the community is significant. The message would be clear:
individuals must pay attention to, connect with, and, importantly, respect others in
need of help. The hope is that this message would change the culture of apathy,
disengagement, and victim objectification in important ways:
As our society has become more mobile, individuals have tended to lose
their community identity and their dependence upon other community
members. . . . As the bonds among community members weaken, so must
the social pressure and individual desire to assist members in distress. A
legal duty to rescue would, in part, replace the waning social duty. 190
Thus, a duty to aid statute would serve to repair broken ties within the community and
reestablish relationships with others by expressly stating a duty to report or rescue and
by condemning those who remain passive in emergencies.
IV. CONCLUSION
Social media dominates personal relationships and interactions with others and the
community. Unsurprisingly, this dominance has influenced bystander behavior,
leading to an increase in apathy when observing crimes online or witnessing tragedies
firsthand. Therefore, Good Samaritan laws must send a message to the community
that bystander apathy is no longer acceptable. Bystanders must choose to report or
help, not watch and livestream; otherwise, they will face penalties. By creating a duty
to assist, the hope is to adjust for the influence of social media and positively change
bystander behavior, ideally motivating those like the online spectators in the Chicago
case and the teenage boys in the Florida case to call authorities and seek help when
possible.

190

Silver, supra note 157, at 434.
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